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ABSTRACT 
We report on a qualitative investigation of the influence of emotions on the decision-making of 
traders in four City of London investment banks, a setting where work has been predominantly 
theorized as dominated by rational analysis. We conclude that emotions and their regulation play 
a central role in traders‘ decision-making. We find differences between high and low performing 
traders in how they engage with their intuitions, and that different strategies for emotion 
regulation have material consequences for trader behavior and performance. Traders deploying 
antecedent-focused emotional regulation strategies achieve a performance advantage over those 
employing primarily response-focused strategies. We argue that, in particular, response-focused 
approaches incur a performance penalty, in part because of the reduced opportunity to combine 
analysis with the use of affective cues in making intuitive judgments.  We discuss the 
implications for our understanding of emotion and decision making, and for traders‘ practice.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In this paper we describe a qualitative study which develops our understanding of the role 
of emotion, intuition and emotion regulation in financial decision-making. The study addresses 
three research questions.  First, it tests whether emotions play a significant role in decision-
making in financial trading, which has been characterized as rational in the classical economic 
sense. A second question concerns the nature of traders‘ own understanding of the role played by 
emotion and affectively cued intuitions in their decision making performance. A third question is 
whether there is a link between traders‘ emotion regulation strategies, engagement with 
affectively cued intuitions and decision making performance. 
Neo-classical financial economics has been a prime influence on research into markets 
and market behavior.  Traders within financial markets have been understood as profit 
maximizers who act on price information, which summarizes all available knowledge about asset 
values (Fama, 1991; 1998). Financial markets are designed to be transparent and have low 
transaction costs such that profit opportunities are only fleetingly available and market 
imperfections are eradicated (MacKenzie, 2006). Within this paradigm there are strong 
assumptions about investor rationality and the nature of investor preferences.  
Understanding of markets and market behavior has been developed by the advent of 
behavioral finance (De Bondt, Palm, & Wolff, 2004; Thaler, 1993) which has drawn upon the 
insights of cognitive psychology to incorporate the ―irrational‖ elements of cognitive biases and 
collective sentiments, such as herding behavior, into models of financial decision making. 
Behavioral finance has had some success in modeling investor behavior and explaining well 
known deviations of market behavior from the predictions of the efficient markets hypothesis – a 
mainstay of the neo-classical paradigm (Fama, 1991).  However, within this field of study, the 
main role accorded to emotions to date is that they are portrayed as interfering with rational 
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cognition, or they are seen as outcomes of the decision process affecting anticipated utility. In 
neither case are they acknowledged as integral and primary in their effects on choice and action 
(e.g. Shefrin, 2000; Peterson 2007).  The trader practitioner literature, though, is full of references 
to emotion and ‗market sentiment‘.  For example: - 
“Trading is emotion. It is mass psychology, greed and fear.” (Marcus in Schwager, 
1993: 49) 
Despite renewed interest in emotions and emotion regulation in the workplace, applied 
empirical work in field settings has been limited (Seo, Barrett, & Bartunek, 2004) and has largely 
focused on the relatively narrow domain of emotional labor, or emotions have been 
decontextualized. In this paper we examine the impact of traders‘ emotions on their perceptions, 
behavior and performance in financial markets using interview data from 118 professional traders 
and 10 senior managers in investment banks.  We consider traders‘ understanding of the role of 
emotion in their trading practice and seek to shed light on the ways in which traders experience 
and regulate work-related emotions and how these processes change with increased expertise. We 
also explore the relationship between traders‘ experience of emotion, emotion regulation, and 
expert performance. Our goal is to build a bridge between experimental and neuroscience 
research into the role of emotions and rich accounts of traders‘ lived experience of emotion in 
their thinking, deciding and acting (Sayer, 1997).  
The structure of this paper is as follows. First, we review relevant literature on emotions 
and cognitions in decision-making and on emotion regulation, including studies of traders and 
investors. Second, we use qualitative data from interviews with traders and their managers to 
address our research questions and discuss the data in relation to the literature. We consider and 
codify traders‘ accounts of the role of emotion in their work and explore the relationship between 
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emotion regulation, approach to engaging with intuition, and trader performance.  Finally, we 
consider the theoretical and practical implications of our findings. 
  
THEORETICAL ORIENTATION 
The Relationship between Emotion and Cognition 
Cognition as a field of study within psychology emerged in the middle of the 20
th
 century 
as a reaction to the dominance of behaviorism (Miller, 2003). A guiding metaphor for much 
cognitive psychology has been the brain-as-computer; an analogy which leaves little place for 
emotion except as a disturbance of optimal cognitive functioning or as a signaling system that 
accompanies action and experience. Thinking has been understood as quite apart from feeling. In 
a major review of research into the relationships between emotions and cognition, Phelps (2006) 
concludes that understanding the role and significance of emotion is critical to understanding 
cognition. It has become clear that cognition is not only affected by emotion, but that emotion is 
central to our cognitive functioning. Current models have converged on dual processing theories 
of cognition (Bechara et al, 1997; Buck, 1999) which suggest that decision-making is 
underpinned by two parallel processes. System one is rapid; pattern recognition activates 
emotionally weighted biases which in turn activate stored behavioral repertoires. This process is 
non-conscious, with important parallels to perceptual processes and linked to intuitive decision 
making (Dane & Pratt, 2007; Epstein et al, 1996). System two, the slower process, involves 
conscious deliberation and analysis (the executive function); facts are represented and weighed, 
options are generated and compared, potential outcomes are modeled and learned reasoning 
strategies are applied.  
Models of the dual process approach consider these two decision processes not as 
completely separate but as interacting. Conscious analysis of a situation can affect emotional 
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appraisal and immediate affective response may be one input among others into deliberation. 
Most of our behaviors (and associated decisions) happen in an automatic fashion with minimal 
active participation by the conscious self unless we are confronted with a novel situation (Bargh 
et al, 1996) or uncertainty (Tiedens & Linton, 2001).  The brain‘s capacity for conscious 
deliberation is limited and can be depleted, much as a muscle can become exhausted (Baumeister 
et al, 1998; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). Thus, particularly in fast-paced and demanding 
environments, conscious deliberation is reserved for tasks that are accorded the highest priority. 
Emotions have an important role as cues to decision making. Finucane et al. (2000) suggest that 
emotions act as a heuristic. That is, emotions provide an accessible summary of experience, 
cognitions and memories. One might expect that traders, given the volume of decision demands, 
will engage in a great deal of automatic decision making and use emotional cues. There is some 
empirical evidence supporting this view.  Lo and Repin (2002) carried out a small-scale study of 
the physiological responses (blood pressure and skin conductance) of professional traders (N=10) 
to actual market events. They found emotional arousal to be a significant factor in the real-time 
financial decision-making of both novice and experienced traders. Less experienced traders 
showed stronger arousal in response to short-term market fluctuations than more experienced 
traders, indicating that emotions are particularly important in relatively novel situations that 
require cognitive effort. 
Emotion and Decision-Making Performance 
There is evidence that emotions affect decision-making performance. First, there is a 
range of evidence that emotions can induce biases in decision-making. Emotions can skew 
information retrieval. For example there is evidence that it is most easy to recall experiences that 
are congruent with current emotional state (Bower, 1981, 1991; Mayer et al. 1990). Emotions 
also directly bias decision-making; for example fear and anger have significant (and opposite) 
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effects on risk perceptions (Lerner & Keltner 2001; Lerner et al., 2004). Additionally, emotions 
bias the value attached to outcomes.  For example intense negative emotions enhance valuation of 
short-term outcomes regardless of negative long term consequences (Gray 1999). Overall, 
positive affect tends to be associated with optimistic decision making, and negative affect with 
pessimistic choices (Isen, et al., 1978; Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Kavanagh & Bower, 1985; 
Mayer & Hanson, 1995; Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Wright & Bower, 1992).  
Emotions also have a role in risk-related decision making. A laboratory study of financial 
decision-making under risk found that low levels of emotional experience led to higher levels of 
performance through greater risk neutrality due to a more constant association between objective 
gain and subjective value (Schunk & Betsch, 2006).  Lo et al. (2005) found clear associations 
between day-traders‘ emotions, their decision making and performance. There was evidence that 
positive decision-making outcomes, as assessed by profits and losses, were associated positively 
with pleasant affect (e.g. content) and negative outcomes with unpleasant affect (e.g. bored). 
Furthermore, investors who experienced more intense positive and negative emotional reactions 
to gain and loss were poorer performers than those with more attenuated emotional responses. 
The authors suggested that rapid, emotional decision making is unsuited to the complex, 
information-rich environment of trading. The trading practitioner literature also tends to promote 
the view that emotions are detrimental to decision making, exemplified in the following quotation 
from highly rated trader Bruce Kovner. ―Whenever a trader says „I wish‟ or „I hope‟, he is 
engaging in a destructive way of thinking because it takes away from the diagnostic thought 
process‖ (Schwager, 1993: 82). In contrast, Seo and Barrett (2007) carried out a study of 
investment club members, using an internet-based investment simulation accompanied by 
emotional-state surveys. They found that individuals who experienced more intense emotions 
achieved higher decision-making performance.  
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Thus while there is ample evidence that emotions affect decision-making performance, 
including for traders, the evidence on the nature of that impact is mixed. While there is evidence 
for the biasing effect of emotions, there is also evidence that we rely on emotional cues in rapid, 
automatic decision-making, and they confer a tangible advantage to everyday decision-making 
(Bechara et al., 1997).   
Research into the nature of expertise has tended to characterize intuition (a form of 
experientially-based pattern recognition linked to the affectively cued system 1 (Dane and Pratt, 
2007)) as integral to expert performance –e.g. Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 2005; Klein et al., 1986; 
Stokes et al., 1997). Dane and Pratt (2007) note an important distinction between, on the one 
hand, the decision heuristics literature, which mainly supports a view of intuitive decision-
making as inferior to more rational models; and, on the other, the literature on expertise, which 
emphasizes the central role of intuition in expert performance. A crucial difference between these 
literatures is the different emphasis placed on research method and context. Research on decision 
heuristics is often context free and relies heavily on experiments using subjects who are 
inexperienced in the tasks studied. There is also evidence that some of the key cognitive biases 
identified as maladaptive products of heuristic reasoning in experimental settings either do not 
occur, or lead to better outcomes when decision-making is studied in the field or studied using 
approaches that approximate real life contexts (Todd & Gigerenzer, 2007). The expertise 
literature, in contrast, places great emphasis on domain specific knowledge and skills, on the 
development of complex cognitive schema that enable rapid associative pattern recognition, and 
on the activation of extensive and complex behavioral repertoires. Dane and Pratt (2007) argue 
that, in consequence, intuition will be more likely to function as an effective component of 
decision-making in performance domains that require significant experience and complex domain 
relevant schema, a description which fits the world of financial trading. 
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In summary, the emotions literature gives considerable support to the idea that emotions 
have multiple critical impacts on decision-making. Some of these can be characterized as bias 
with the potential to be detrimental to decision-making performance. However, it is also apparent 
that there is an alternative position: it is not emotions per se that are detrimental to decision-
making performance, but rather that expertise and the regulation of emotions determine whether 
emotions have positive or negative impacts on decision performance.  
Emotion Regulation 
Accounts of emotions as bias focus primarily on the potential for emotions to have a 
negative influence on performance. By contrast, accounts of emotions as information focus 
primarily on the valuable role of emotions in encapsulating prior relevant experience. In 
principle, these two perspectives may not incompatible and effective emotion regulation may 
have a role in reducing the biasing effect of emotion while retaining sensitivity to the information 
which emotions may carry. It thus seems likely that the regulation of emotion may play an 
important role in emotion performance effects.   Gross (2002; Gross & Thompson, 2007), 
distinguishes a series of different stages in emotion episodes and five associated emotion 
regulation strategies. The model suggests that people both choose and modify situations.  
Situations require attention and appraisal, which leads to an emotional response.  
Attempts to manage emotions may focus on any of the stages indicated in the above 
model. One approach to managing emotions is to select, avoid, or modify situations. Other 
approaches include focusing attention on emotionally salient elements of a situation and, where 
emotional responses might be difficult to cope with, reframing situations to modify the emotional 
response. It is also possible to avoid emotional responses by refocusing attention elsewhere. Each 
of these strategies could lead to responses being modulated or suppressed.  Gross and Thompson 
(2007: 16) make clear that this model of emotions and their regulation is something of a 
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simplification. However, the model usefully illustrates the central role of emotion regulation in 
decision-making.  
In addition to theoretical modeling, there is empirical evidence for a relationship between 
strategies for emotion regulation and a range of important outcomes.  Recent research has paid 
particular attention to the difference in outcomes between antecedent-focused emotion regulation 
strategies, which seek to change emotions before emotion responses have become fully activated, 
and response-focused regulation strategies, which modify behavior and emotion expression once 
the emotion response is underway. Emotion regulation strategies have been shown to have 
differential effects on outcomes including cognitive performance, health, and qualities of social 
interaction (Gross and Thompson, 2007). In the domain of work performance much attention has 
focused on the emotional labor required by customer service interactions. Here, emotion 
regulation has been characterized as a process of deep and surface acting.  Surface acting is the 
faking of emotion display to accord with organization display rules.  Deep acting involves 
modifying inner feelings.  Grandey (2000) considers emotional labor as a subset of emotion 
regulation and equates antecedent-focused and response-focused regulation with deep and surface 
acting respectively.  In a study of front-line service workers Grandey (2003) found antecedent-
focused emotion regulation was associated with greater effectiveness in relating to customers in a 
warm friendly manner while response-focused emotion regulation was associated with emotional 
exhaustion and greater tendency to 'break character' and reveal negative emotions in a service 
encounter. This result supports Gross‘s earlier work (2002). There is also some evidence on 
emotion regulation and financial decision-making. Seo and Barret (2007) found that investors 
who were better able to identify and discriminate among their current feelings achieved superior 
decision-making performance. They argued that this relationship was mediated by effective 
regulation of the influence of feelings on their decision-making.  
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In the present study we go beyond the study of emotion regulation in a context of work 
performance that depends primarily on social interaction. In contrast to emotional labor studies, 
which focus on the context of interpersonal interaction, most trading nowadays (and in all cases 
we studied) is conducted electronically via computer or through highly abbreviated and 
formalized electronic messages with counterparties. Rather than depending on appropriate 
emotion display in the context of customer interaction or negotiating with counterparties trader 
performance depends on selecting optimal trading strategies in the face of complex cognitive 
demands and the need to process significant amounts of information with uncertain relevance 
(Knorr-Cetina & Bruegger 2002). We now turn to the present study. 
THE STUDY AND METHODS 
The data reported in this paper were collected as part of a large multifaceted study of the 
role and behavior of traders working in investment banks. For this paper we have returned to this 
data corpus to examine the considerable amount that traders told us about their work and 
emotion, an aspect touched on only superficially in previous analysis of this data (see Fenton-
O'Creevy, Nicholson, Soane, and Willman, 2005 for an extended account of the study). 
Participants  
Participants were sampled from four leading investment banks with offices in the City of 
London. Three banks were American and one was European. Managers in each organization were 
asked to select a representative sample of traders from a range of markets; trading in stocks, 
bonds and derivatives. The mean age of participants was 32.81 years (s.d. = 4.91).  There was 
variation in traders‘ experience, with overall tenure (including time with previous employers) in a 
range from 6 months to 30 years, and a mean job tenure of 7.80 years (s.d. = 5.58). The trader 
sample comprised 116 men (98.3%) and 2 women (1.7%). The participants were traders in 
equities, bonds and derivatives, most engaged in either market making or proprietary trading or 
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both.  We gathered information on individual trader characteristics and performance and carried 
out semi-structured interviews with each trader and with a further 10 senior managers. Where 
traders were also managers we interviewed them twice, once as a trader and once as a manager. 
Data  
Qualitative data. Interviews lasted between 30 and 90 minutes. They were recorded and 
transcribed in full.  The interviews ranged over multiple aspects of the traders‘ roles and work.  
The data set for this study consisted of the portions of the interviews relevant to the role of 
feelings in traders‘ work and decision making. Traders were asked to describe the range of 
emotions they experienced during trading.  Follow-up questions encouraged them to explore the 
long-term and short-term effects of emotions on their decision making and trading strategy, the 
role of intuition in their trading and the impact of emotions on performance. Managers were 
asked to describe how they evaluated and managed trader performance. Again, this often 
produced talk about traders‘ feelings and how they were managed. 
Performance data. Hard performance data for traders are difficult to obtain.  Measures 
such as value at risk, trading outcomes and profit and loss are highly confidential in this setting 
and were not available to us, so we used total remuneration as our measure of trader performance. 
We felt this to be a reasonable proxy for decision-performance since a high proportion of total 
remuneration is a variable annual performance linked bonus, and the non-bonus elements tend to 
reflect longer term financial performance in this very performance oriented sector. We have 
treated this variable as an indicator of expertise, which Ericsson (2006) defines as ‗reliably 
superior performance‘. Traders were asked to state their income, including bonus, in terms of 
four categories (1. £50,000 - £99,999 (N = 4); 2. £100,000 to £299,999 (N = 41); 3. £300,000-
£499,999 (N = 34); 4. more than £500,000(N = 38).  One trader declined to provide this 
information.  
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Analysis 
 The raw data were the full transcripts of all interviews. We used a thematic analysis 
approach, which we judged to be particularly well suited to the present study.   As Braun and 
Clarke (2006: 78) note, thematic analysis does not rest on a single epistemic position but can 
span both realist and constructivist approaches. We take the position that emotions have both a 
measurable biological reality and exist in the realm of socially constructed personal experience in 
which emotions have personal and social meaning. 
 Data were open-coded by each author separately then in discussion, using the NVIVO 
program. Common statements were identified and used as the basis for a first set of coding 
categories which were subsequently refined and consolidated. Coding categories were thus both 
emergent from the interviews and drew on constructs identified in the literature (e.g. approaches 
to emotion regulation) relevant to emerging themes. Thus coding was both theoretical and 
inductive. As we analyzed the data and drew tentative conclusions, we explicitly sought 
disconfirming evidence to test the robustness of our insights. In a later stage of analysis we 
partitioned the sample into groups of low (<5 years, n=25) medium (5 to 10 years, n=48) and 
high experience (>10 years N=45) and into groups of low (remuneration< £300k, N=45) medium 
(£300k- £500k, N=34) and high expertise (> £500k, N=38). We compare interview responses of 
three specific groups: inexperienced low paid traders (N=18), highly experienced but low paid 
traders (N=15) and high paid traders (N=38). The remainder of the sample were medium 
experience and pay. There were no low experience, high pay, traders. We chose the three 
comparison groups to provide maximal contrast in differentiating the characteristics associated 
with different levels of experience and expertise respectively. 
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In Table 1 we summarize our key findings and the nature of the evidence for each finding. 
In the final column we note our sense of the strength of the evidence for each finding. This 
represents a qualitative conclusion arrived at though discussion between the authors and drawing 
on quantity, consistency, importance and clarity of supporting data, and existence of any 
disconfirming evidence. In the next section of the paper we discuss these findings and the 
evidence for them in more detail. Direct quotes are verbatim, accompanied by the case number of 
the respondent and their classification in terms of experience and pay level. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
TRADERS’ UNDERSTANDINGS OF EMOTION IN THEIR TRADING PRACTICE 
Emotional experience and regulation 
For many traders, especially the less experienced, trading is marked by significant and 
persistent emotional responses to successes and setbacks.  It is relevant to note the distinction 
between mood and emotion, since both were relevant to traders. Mood can be understood as a 
relatively diffuse emotional climate which persists over time and not anchored to specific 
situations or cognitions. In contrast, emotions typically have specific objects and give rise to 
behavioral response tendencies relevant to those objects (Totterdell, Briner et al., 1996). 
“When you lose money you could sit down and cry. Anybody who says you couldn‟t 
isn‟t being honest with you. Of course when it‟s good, it‟s fantastic. The highs and 
lows of a trader‟s life are euphoria or absolute dismay.” 106: high experience, 
medium pay 
While these emotional responses would often be triggered by specific events or series of 
events, in many cases the impact on mood would persist for significant periods with 
consequences for subsequent trading behavior. For example, one manager described a trader 
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working for him as ―having been in the wilderness, his confidence totally shattered‖ for about 
two years before slowly recovering from a string of losses. Many talked about needing weeks or 
even months to recover from the impact of major losses, especially early in their careers. Others 
talked about the dangers of false confidence or euphoria which could persist for some time after a 
big win. 
 “People get a bit arrogant when they have good times, but this can be dangerous 
because then they stop thinking as much.” 18: medium experience, medium pay 
“I tend to feel more cautious when losing money…If I am having a down month, I‟ll 
look at trades, which I would do if I was having a good month, and say I don‟t like it 
enough to take the risk on it. I become more selective, more risk averse and to do a 
trade I need to see more than one reason why a trade will work and then  might put it 
on, but not in a huge size. When making money, I can be more slack.‖ 29: high 
experience, high pay 
However, our data also suggest emotion regulation is critical to moderating the impact of 
emotions on traders‘ decision making. Senior traders and trader managers frequently talked about 
the way in which they had developed a capacity to regulate their own emotions and trade more 
evenly regardless of success and setbacks:  
 “You learn to be able to deal with emotions. It doesn‟t get to me as much. There 
were situations when I was extremely stressed up and then you feel physically ill and 
you really feel on the verge of throwing up. But that was a long time ago and doesn‟t 
happen so much now. You have seen the ups and downs more. You have experienced 
them; and in a way you are probably more prepared for it and you are aware that 
every now and then it will happen… but it doesn‟t get to you all that much because 
you are aware that it will happen.‖ 6: medium experience, high pay 
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We examined emotion regulation and its relevance to performance further by considering 
data from the three comparison groups (based on experience and pay). We noticed some 
important differences in the way in which these groups discussed the interaction between 
emotion, trading and the use of intuition. First, there seemed to be notable differences in the 
strategies employed for emotion regulation, which we describe below in the language of the 
Gross and Thompson model (2007). When asked directly about emotion, traders in the low 
experience group typically started by presenting themselves as fairly immune to the impact of 
emotion on their trading. However, as the interview progressed they would often reveal rather 
more vulnerability to emotions than they had claimed initially. Take for example this trader who 
had been trading for a little less than 4 years: - 
“I‟m bit of a cold fish; I don‟t think emotions greatly affect my decision-making. If 
you are making money, you are achieving your objective.…  
[But later] 
…When you lose money, it can be horrendous, violent mood swings. You don‟t know 
what to do when you lose money.” 38: low experience, low pay 
There tended to be two responses types when these traders did talk about their emotions. 
Some in the low experience, low pay group did not talk at all about actively managing their 
emotions. Others talked about removing themselves from situations when their emotions became 
a problem (situation modification), or avoiding situations entirely which make them feel bad 
(situation selection). 
“I think there is a strong emotional element to trading. I think that anyone who‟s 
doing it properly and has got their head screwed on is doing everything they can 
consciously to overrule that, and if I feel that I‟m trading emotionally I will walk off 
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the desk, have a glass of water, walk up and down the street and then come back and 
make decisions when I‟m hopefully not emotional.” 43: low experience, low pay 
Traders in the experienced group more commonly talked about strategies for emotion 
regulation. However the nature of these strategies tended to vary between the low paid and high 
paid groups. In the high experience, low paid group, traders seemed to find it hard to articulate 
how they managed their emotions and the emotion regulation strategies they identified were 
predominately situation avoidance,  situation modification and response modulation:  
“If you get two or three decisions wrong you find you might not take a risk for a 
month until you build up your confidence. There‟s definitely a lot of confidence 
involved.” 104: high experience, low pay 
“I try and keep my emotions under tight control.” 105: high experience, low pay 
There is a marked contrast in the discourse of the high performing traders, who often 
showed a greater willingness to reflect on their emotion-driven behavior (the two exceptions to 
this were traders with whom we had only short interviews with little opportunity for extended 
reflection, rather than any denial of the role of emotion).  Emotion regulation for these traders 
tended to focus mainly on how they directed their attention (attentional deployment) and how 
they framed experiences of loss and gain (cognitive change).  
“Big losses and big gains can swap around fairly quickly and once you understand 
that then you stop concentrating on the loss and you start concentrating more on how 
to make money back. … One big trade is not going to make anyone and one big loss 
doesn‟t destroy you.” 15: high experience, high pay 
“Experience definitely helps, having traded through the crash etc. You've seen 
different scenarios and newer people it's like oh my god, it's the end of the world, 
whereas there is life after death and so I think that type of experience helps. It doesn't 
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necessarily help the new situation on what to do but it just helps your judgment.”  55: 
high experience, high pay 
There was a notable absence of avoidant behavior in this group. Several participants told 
stories which implied a significant degree of persistence in the face of negative emotion. 
“I had one very bad year from which I learned quite a lot. I learned that the 
overshooting can go on for a very long time, it can be very painful; you can hit risk 
limits. … I did not want to get out of the trades so kept the trades and then next year 
they made more money than they lost. I don‟t think I panicked, but I was getting calls 
from the CEO. Reason prevailed in the end. Emotionally, it was not easy to cope 
with. There were times when the desk was down close to $100m, I lost almost that 
much in days. I was under a lot of pressure from New York because they did not 
understand my positions, but in the end, we managed to keep the positions and made 
money the next year. The hardest thing was persuading others that I had a good 
trade.” 14: high experience, high pay 
This willingness among some of the high performing traders to experience negative 
emotion in order to achieve longer term goals is consistent with Labouvie-Vief‘s (2003) 
argument that positive self-development requires not just strategies to optimize positive affect, 
but also the ability to tolerate tension and negativity to achieve long term goals.   
However, there may be another important reason why response modulation strategies are 
maladaptive for traders. As we have seen above, while poorly regulated emotions carry over to 
subsequent trading and risk biasing subsequent trading behavior, emotion cues generated by 
reactions to information relevant to current trading under time constraints play an important role 
in guiding attention and rapidly choosing appropriate action.  Both poor regulation of non-
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relevant emotions and recourse to the attempted suppression of all feeling run the risk of masking 
these important cues.  
 
The Role of Managers in Emotion Regulation 
Further evidence of the importance of emotions and their regulation to trader performance 
came from interviews with trader managers. A few managers described their role in primarily 
technical terms; focusing on risk management and personal supervision of problematic trades. 
However, many of those we interviewed clearly saw regulating the emotions of traders who 
worked for them as a key element in managing trader performance: 
“I have to play the role of director of emotions in the sense that when they are down 
you have to boost their morale and when they are too excited they want to do stupid 
things, I have to cool them down” 119: senior manager 
“I care deeply because I have tremendous pride in the people here…The stress is 
generated by fear entirely and it‟s fear of what?  I guess everyone has their 
insecurities whether it‟s being fired, losing lots of money and appearing stupid in 
front of their peer group.  Whatever it is it‟s definitely fear and if you can take the 
fear out of the situation they perform better.” 123: senior trader manager, high 
experience, high pay  
Many traders described such episodes of managerial intervention as crucial to their 
learning and development. For example:- 
“I lost $1m in the first 10 days of the year. This was at a time when if you made $1m 
in a year, that was huge. I was devastated and my boss asked me for lunch at the 
weekend - I thought that was the end of my career. My boss said „a lot of the guys 
think you‟re OK, but they are worried you are going to be afraid to trade, that you‟re 
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going to be gun shy and lose your confidence. We want you to know that we like you 
and if you think you‟ve got to buy them, buy them and if you‟ve got to sell them, sell 
them but whatever you do don‟t stop trading.‟ So that was a huge relief. Since then, I 
don‟t get too depressed about losing money, although there are always good days 
and bad days.” 25: low experience, medium performance 
Other managers clearly gave thought to the relative strengths and weaknesses of more 
intuitive versus more analytical traders in their decisions about matching traders to roles: - 
“A gut trader should trade a liquid market - he might change his feel so he needs to 
get out.  The analytical trader who thinks much more about what he‟s doing will 
change their mind less often, and trade with a different time frame.  A gut trader can 
be bullish in the morning.  The analytical trader will look at something for a week 
and then put on a position - less important to get in and out.  He doesn‟t need to be in 
a liquid market - in an emerging market you need a more analytical trader.” 122, 
Manager 
“Derivatives are very quantitative and people think if you have a PhD you will be 
very good because you have an understanding of options theory, but this is not 
always the case and you tend to overlook things. Although you can put the 
parameters into the model, there are still a lot of things which are uncertain. 
Sometimes adding a more qualitative feel to it –„yes that‟s what the model says, but 
the risk doesn‟t look right‟. … I tend to have a mixture of people on the desk - those 
who are more quantitative and those who are more common sense or gut instinct 
traders. Having the blend is quite useful for bouncing ideas.” 124: Manager 
These reflections have implications for management strategies in trading environments, or 
indeed any others where the main role of the operative is complex decision-making under 
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constraints of time and uncertain and incomplete information. We consider these points further in 
our discussion. 
 
Emotional Cues and the Use of Intuition 
The second broad theme concerned the role of emotional cues in traders‘ decision-
making. Many of the traders discussed this aspect of emotion as intuition. Traders‘ own accounts 
and conceptualizations of intuition fit well with Dane and Pratt‘s (2007;40) definition of intuition 
as ―affectively charged judgments that arise through rapid, non-conscious and holistic 
associations‖.  For example: - 
 “[W]ithout a doubt, some of the best bargains are the ones you don't do! You know 
they're bad bargains.  You know. It‟s a gut feel. You've looked at the playing field and 
you just know this is a bad bargain.” 106: high experience, moderate pay 
Some of the traders see a more subtle and sophisticated role for emotions, which represent 
an unconscious drawing on experience: - 
“I think many people do say they're gut-feel traders but perhaps they're not analyzing 
what they're actually thinking and they're seeing a lot of customer flow and a lot of 
buyers and they probably don't necessarily realize the reasons why they want to buy. 
But there are very good traders that say they're trading off gut feel that I believe 
actually have probably reasonable information, reasonable thoughts behind it but 
they wouldn't literally toss a coin” 55: high experience, high pay 
Feelings are also seen as a kind of radar, directing attention and shaping perceptions 
around opportunities, to enable them to be promptly seized. 
“I think what a trader has to have is not necessarily this gut feeling but this nose for 
opportunities. If an opportunity comes along you have to be able to spot it and see it 
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and sometimes people you typically find in this business - an opportunity is there and 
they can't see it and then it's taken by someone else and it's like oh yeah, that was a 
good idea but it is gone.” 58: high experience, low pay 
 Not only do feelings act as a kind of radar directing attention but they do so in a way that 
enables rapid decision making under time pressure. As one trader noted: - 
“Trading includes stuff which is beyond trading. Trading is when you make decisions 
involving financial risk that have two qualities: you have to make them in someone 
else‟s time schedule, not your own and when you make a decision you have to be 
confident when you have incomplete or imperfect information and therefore there 
must be some kind of intuitive or qualitative element.” 121: high experience, high pay 
Experienced traders made much more reference to intuition, or ‗gut feel‘ as they often 
phrased it, than less experienced traders. However, again, there were important differences 
between low and high paid traders in the high experience group. Low paid traders who talked 
about the use of intuition often talked of it in terms of a rather mysterious process. You either had 
a feeling or not. For example:   
“It‟s almost like a sixth sense. Something comes over you and you feel like - yes I 
know they‟re going to be looking to buy these later on or looking to sell these later 
on.” 116: high experience, low pay 
By contrast the top paid group tended to reflect critically about the origins of their 
intuitions and to bring them together with more objective information: - 
“If I do fancy a stock - you have a feeling, it feels right, it has done nothing for like 
two or three months and you‟ve seen sellers and they start to dwindle and it is just 
stagnant and then you have a look on the charts, you refer to the technical side as 
well as the emotional side of the trade.  So you know a combination of technical and 
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emotional as well as what the analyst thinks, as well so you sort of bring the 
instruments you have available to you to make the decision rather than the snap 
[snaps his finger] I fancy buying that.” 101: high experience, high pay 
“I may examine opportunities based on intuition that something is going to happen, 
but the decision is based on something I think is rational.” 68: medium experience, 
high pay. 
Reported use of intuition does seem to increase with trader experience. However, traders‘ 
engagement with their feelings is qualitatively different between low and high performers. High 
performing traders seem to engage with their intuitions at a meta-cognitive level and make 
judgments about the relevance of these feelings to the decision at hand. This is consistent with 
the growing literature on expertise which points to experience as a necessary but insufficient 
condition for the development of expertise and points to the role of extended critical engagement 
with practice in developing expertise (Ericsson, 2006; Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Roemer, 
1993).   
Traders were not universally positive about the role of intuition in market decision making. 
Some believed reliance on such feelings yields poor outcomes: - 
“Many traders feel that models have been developed by academics who do not know 
markets and [traders] think that gut feeling is more important. My experience is that 
this is 100% wrong and computers can make better decisions than traders.” 37: 
medium experience, medium pay 
Overall, however, the data support a picture of expert traders having a meta-cognitive 
engagement with emotion regulation. This process entails discrimination between emotions in 
terms of their relevance to the decision at hand and effective strategies for emotion regulation to 
enhance performance. 
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Empathy  
The third identified theme was empathy: monitoring own emotions as information 
about what other market players might be feeling.  Only five traders explicitly described 
using their own capacity for empathy as a decision making tool. Although not frequent in 
our data, these examples are important, illustrating that there is a path for traders beyond 
simply seeking to eliminate or reduce the intensity of their emotions.  These traders 
fostered feelings as a source of information about other market actors which they managed 
and used in a self-aware analysis.  One trader described using his own fear as an indicator 
of fear in the market. Another described actively imagining the feelings of other market 
actors: ―trying to put myself in [the Bank of England Governor‘s] feet to develop a feel for 
how he feels and thinks‖ 14: high experience, high pay.  
Three traders talked about an emotional affinity with the feelings of people in 
national markets (Spain 34: high experience: medium pay; Italy 70: medium experience, 
low pay; and Japan 117: high experience, medium pay) with whom they shared a common 
culture and propensity to react emotionally in similar ways to the same market events. This 
group was small, but these data broaden the picture of traders ‗reasoning with emotion‘, 
and offer a potentially rich and fruitful avenue for future research.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
To ask whether emotion disturbs or aids traders‘ decision-making is to ask the wrong 
question.  Traders‘ emotions and cognition are inextricably linked. Therefore a more productive 
question to ask in this context is whether there are more or less effective strategies for managing 
and using emotion in financial decision-making.  This has been the thrust of our analysis, which 
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sought to move beyond previous work that simply characterizes emotional arousal as detrimental 
to performance (e.g. Lo et al., 2005; Schunk and Bersh, 2006).  The study contributes to our 
understanding of the role of emotions in work and decision-making in several distinct ways. In 
contributing to our understanding of the role of emotion at work, this study has particular 
relevance in that it considers a work domain which has been theorized as strongly normatively 
rational as opposed to a work domain (such as negotiation or customer service) where 
performance is primarily dependent on effective social interaction. However, it is clear from this 
study that even within such an analysis-intensive domain as financial trading emotion plays a 
central role. Traders and their managers are frequently preoccupied with the effective regulation 
and use of emotions in their work. Our work points to the value of a more nuanced understanding 
which considers the role of emotions in decision-making, the differential impact of various 
emotion regulation strategies, the conditions under which ‗gut-feel‘ may support effective 
decision-making and the role of empathic responses in understanding the behavior of other 
market actors.  
Effective emotion regulation seems to be a critical success factor in trading, for our 
findings suggest that the strategies for emotion regulation adopted by expert, higher performing 
traders are qualitatively different from those of lower performing traders. In particular, higher 
performers are more inclined to regulate emotions through attentional deployment and cognitive 
change and may display a willingness to cope with negative feelings in the interests of 
maintaining objectivity and pursuing longer term goals. The kind of attention and appraisal-
focused emotion regulation strategies used by high-performing traders do not seem to be too 
cognitively expensive and are effective in reducing negative experience of emotion (Gross, 
2002).   By contrast, less expert traders engage either in avoidant behaviors, such as walking 
away from the desk, or invest significant cognitive effort in modulating their emotional 
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responses.  This extends previous findings (e.g. Grandey 2003) concerning the performance 
benefits of antecedent versus response-focused emotion regulation in the context of emotion 
labor to the very different context of financial decision-making.  Our findings also suggest that 
willingness to endure negative feelings in pursuit of long-term goals may be more adaptive than 
purely defensive strategies aimed at maintaining positive feelings (Labouvie-Vief, 2003; Tamir, 
2005).   
This study also provides evidence that more effective emotion regulation strategies can be 
learned in a financial decision-making context. While an individual‘s preferred approach to 
emotion regulation is likely to be influenced by personality traits, neuroticism and extroversion in 
particular (Gross & John, 2003), our interviews with traders and their managers also point to the 
importance of traders‘ learned strategies for emotion regulation.   Importantly our study also 
suggests that defensive emotion regulation strategies may be problematic because they reduce 
opportunities to exercise expert intuition.   
These findings go well beyond prior research on emotion regulation and performance 
(e.g. Grandey 2003), which has a primary focus on performance in the context of interpersonal 
interaction. Our findings uniquely address the performance of professional traders for whom 
performance is not primarily dependent on interpersonal interaction, and which has been 
theorized as strongly rational, involving the selection of optimal strategies in the face of complex 
cognitive demands, and requiring attention to a large volume of information with uncertain 
relevance. 
Turning to intuition, traders in our study mirror the balance of opinion in the research 
literature on intuition.  They are equivocal about whether feelings and hunches about appropriate 
courses of action lead to better or worse outcomes than purely rational analysis. There were 
strong feelings on both sides, with traders being quite evenly divided between the two camps. 
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However, again our study suggests the importance of a more nuanced approach than simply 
asking whether reliance on intuition is good or bad, and points towards the conditions in which 
reliance on intuitive judgment may be more and less effective. The findings suggest that one 
characteristic of higher performing traders may be a greater willingness to reflect critically about 
their intuitions and feelings about trading. These traders often reported relying on intuition, but 
they tend to weigh their feelings critically alongside other evidence and to reflect about the 
provenance of those feelings. Lower performing traders may rely on feelings alone, and show 
less propensity to think critically about the source of hunches.  This reflection by expert traders 
about the provenance of feelings may be particularly salient given Schwarz and Clore‘s (1983; 
2003) finding that the impact of emotions on behavior is reduced or disappears when the 
relevance of those emotions is explicitly called into question.  
That traders‘ reliance on affective cues in decision-making can support effective 
performance is consistent with Damasio‘s observation that deciding advantageously depends on 
the use of affective cues in both learning and deciding (Bechara et al., 1997; Damasio, 1994).  
There is increasing evidence that humans are naturally proficient in the ability to acquire 
expertise and that encapsulation of experience in expert intuition and perception via system one 
provides a means of by-passing cognitive limits (Ericsson, 2006).  The nature of expertise could 
counteract the inherent environmental uncertainties that Tiedens and Linton (2001) identified as 
leading to more conscious appraisal of information. While not an unequivocal result, our finding 
of greater critical engagement among higher performing traders with intuitions and their more 
sophisticated deployment of intuition, in combination with analysis, suggests an important 
direction for future research.  
The small number of accounts of traders monitoring their own emotions as a source of 
information about the emotions of other market actors was intriguing. These data suggest a 
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possibly productive avenue for future research. We do not have evidence of performance 
outcomes of predictive uses of empathy in this manner, but our findings are consistent with 
arguments that the evolution of the human brain has been significantly driven by the need to 
predict the behavior of other humans, often via subtle cues (e.g. Nicholson 2000). 
We suggest that the identification of links between decision-making performance and 
emotion regulation in this study has important implications for theory development in two key 
fields. First, while somewhat tacit in much of the literature, the implication of many claims in the 
decision-making and behavioral finance literatures is that a range of key decision-making biases 
are underpinned by mechanisms which involve emotion processes. One relevant explicit example 
is Thaler‘s (1985, 1999) account of the role of ‗hedonic editing‘ in mental accounting and the 
disposition effect (the tendency to hold losing assets longer than winning assets). This explains 
key biases in terms of the desire to maintain positive hedonic tone.  There is evidence too of 
interpersonal variation in propensity to exhibit such biases, for example, investors vary in their 
propensity to exhibit the disposition effect (Shapira & Venezia, 2001; Weber & Welfens, 2008). 
In this study we have seen that traders seek to regulate emotions in order to avoid decision biases, 
and that higher performing traders typically exhibit more sophisticated emotion regulation 
strategies. This suggests that it would be productive to investigate the role of emotion regulation 
as one key source of interpersonal variation in susceptibility to a range of decision biases. 
A second implication concerns the role of emotion in expert performance. While much 
attention has been paid to the nature of cognition in expert performance, the expertise literature 
hardly considers the role of emotion.  For example, examining the index of the Cambridge 
Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance (Ericsson et al, 2006) reveals very few 
references to emotion; and these are peripheral to the main arguments of the chapters which 
contain them. Our research suggests, first, that effective emotion regulation may be an important 
  
29 
facet of expert performance and, second, that greater attention should be paid to the interactions 
between emotion, emotion regulation, and expert intuition. Further research could test the 
proposition that effective expert intuition is reduced by reliance on defensive emotion regulation 
strategies. 
While our study points to the importance of intuition in traders‘ work, it may be that the 
relative importance of intuition and analysis vary with task characteristics such as time span of 
decision-making. Certainly this seemed to be the view of several senior managers with 
responsibility for allocating traders to trading roles. The interplay that expert traders described 
between intuition and analysis is also intriguing.  The importance of context to the role of affect 
in decision-making has been noted in prior research (Forgas & George, 2001). Further research 
could usefully explore this aspect of traders‘ expertise.  
This study also contains some potentially important implications for practice. First, it 
points to the importance of learned strategies for emotion regulation and the need for effective 
support for their development. Second, our data directly and indirectly point to the key role of 
management in this process.  Our findings suggest that there may be considerable benefits to 
skilled managerial interventions that help to steer effective emotion regulation and support 
inexperienced traders in developing emotion regulation skills. Additionally, managers may be 
able to help traders to understand the productive role that critically engaged, experience-based, 
intuition may play in decision-making.  Our evidence suggests that many high performing traders 
deploy a reflective and critical approach to the use and development of intuition, well-founded in 
experience.  Managers could help to guide this process through coaching. The contextual 
dependence of high quality intuitions suggests they are quite domain specific and may not 
transfer across contexts.  As several informants told us, this is especially true for traders operating 
under different market conditions.  
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 We heard repeated concerns from senior managers who worried about traders who had 
not seen a bear market and would not operate well when that occurred.  We also heard many 
stories of people transferring between trading areas and needing time to re-contextualize 
expertise before their intuitions could be considered reliable. Thus managers have a role in 
helping traders to extend the boundaries of their expertise. Given recent events in financial 
markets, our findings may be relevant to an understanding of how traders react under massively 
changed trading conditions and how those reactions might either contribute to or result from 
market volatility. 
This research has some important limitations. First, although we have argued for the 
importance of an account of emotion that includes the experience of emotion, as Pham (2004: 
368) notes, the affective system is focused on the present. Thus people can be poor at recalling or 
predicting emotions. There are limits to the human capacity to introspect on emotion processes 
and to recall the experience of emotion.  These limits are also subject to wide individual 
differences. The capacity for introspection and recall will also vary between individuals. For this 
reason studies such as ours need to be complemented with more physiologically based research 
as well as further qualitative and quantitative studies. 
Second, as in all work contexts, traders subscribe to norms of socially sanctioned 
behavior and to common narratives about the nature of their work. We have not treated emotional 
labor as a primary component of traders‘ work and performance. The majority of work 
interactions are carried out through highly abbreviated electronic exchanges which provide a poor 
medium for the communication of emotion.  However, there is a sense in which traders engage in 
emotional labor since, especially for novices, there are social pressures to comply with display 
rules which emphasize the avoidance of displays of strong emotion.  One common narrative 
thread that ran though many traders‘ accounts of their work was a representation of trading work 
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as principally concerned with rational analysis from which emotions are a dangerous distraction. 
This narrative seemed particularly strong in the accounts of less experienced traders. Although, as 
we have seen, the mask would often slip as they discussed their work. Some traders‘ accounts 
were clearly colored by a desire to conform to this mode of self-presentation. In consequence it is 
possible that in our interviews and during data analysis we were at times unable to distinguish 
effectively between defensive denial of emotion and effective regulation of emotion.  This would 
be another avenue for future research. 
To conclude, we know that emotions are a rich source of experience in everyday life, but 
at the same time in work contexts they can be a source of vulnerability, a wayward influence over 
judgment, and a source of disturbance to process.  The more ―rational-economic‖ such 
environments are, the more likely we are to hold such beliefs (Nicholson, 2000).  Our research 
illustrates that this position is false or, at best, short-sighted.   In the hyper-rational world of 
trading in financial markets we did find some evidence that emotions disturbed performance, but 
mostly among the inexperienced and un-reflective traders.  The best traders are able to regulate 
emotions effectively, and incorporate relevant emotions as information – signals, or a kind of 
radar that contain information about risks, what is going on in the minds of others, and the weight 
and relevance to be accorded to one‘s own past experience.   
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TABLE 1: Summary of key findings and supporting evidence 
 
Theme Nature of evidence Strength of evidence 
Detrimental effect of non-
relevant emotions: 
Mood swings induced by 
prior trading outcomes are a 
significant (detrimental) 
factor in traders’ decision-
making 
The majority of interviewees stressed 
the importance and difficulty of 
managing their emotions and mood 
following large gains or losses.  A 
minority claimed to have no 
difficulty at all. These seemed to fall 
into three groups. A small number 
who consistently claimed to be 
constitutionally unemotional, a larger 
group of (mostly inexperienced) 
traders who seemed concerned to 
present themselves as adhering to an 
ideal type of the ‗unemotional trader‘ 
but  talked at times in ways which 
undermined this self presentation; 
and more senior traders who 
presented a narrative of overcoming 
the influence of  mood on their 
decision-making through hard won 
experience. 
The data shown in the results section 
are representative of the range of 
emotional expression 
 
Strong 
Emotion regulation and 
performance: 
There are marked differences 
in emotion regulation 
strategies between 
inexperienced traders, 
experienced low performing 
traders and experienced high 
performing traders  
 
Clear differences in description of 
emotion regulation strategies 
emerged between novice traders, 
experienced low performers and 
experienced high performers. There 
was a high level of agreement about 
these differences between different 
authors coding separately, and there 
were few counter examples. 
Strong 
Managers and emotion 
regulation: 
Trader managers play an 
important role as regulators 
of traders’ emotions 
Not all managers in our sample saw 
themselves as having a role in 
managing traders‘ emotions. 
However, stories about the role 
managers played in managing 
traders‘ emotion were a frequent 
component of traders‘ and managers‘ 
accounts of emotions in trading. 
Moderate 
  
36 
There were no specific counter 
examples although not all managers 
talked about their role in managing 
emotions. 
 
Intuition: 
Affectively cued intuitions 
play an important role in 
traders decision-making 
Traders talk often contained 
references to the use of intuition. 
Their language in relation to the use 
of intuition often had a visceral 
component or related to feelings. 
They talked of ‗gut feel‘, ‗having a 
nose for‘,  ‗it‘s like having 
whiskers‘, ‗it just felt right‘, ‗the 
risks felt wrong‘. There was 
considerable variation in what 
individual traders claimed about their 
personal reliance on intuition with a 
roughly even split between those 
who claimed to rely on intuition a 
great deal and those who claimed to  
use it little or not at all. However, 
nearly all felt it to be an important 
element of decision making for many 
traders. Opinions also seemed split 
between those who felt intuition and 
associated feelings to be a valuable 
aid, and those who felt them to lead 
to bad decisions. 
The data shown in the results section 
are representative of the available 
range. 
 
Strong 
Intuition and performance: 
Differences among 
experienced traders between 
low and high performers in 
‘critical engagement with 
intuitions’. 
Experienced high performers were 
no more or less likely to report 
relying on intuition than experienced 
low performers. However, 
experienced high performers were 
more likely to report reflecting 
critically about the origins of their 
intuitions and to report bringing 
them together with other more 
objective sources of evidence. There 
was reasonable agreement among 
authors coding separately. There 
were a few counter examples. 
 
Moderate 
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Empathy: 
Self-monitoring of emotion as 
a basis for understanding and 
predicting emotions of other 
market actors can be a factor 
in traders decision-making 
Five traders (of 118) explicitly and 
spontaneously described using their 
own emotions as a source of 
information about the likely 
emotional state of other market 
actors. There were no specific 
counter examples, however, these 
data were emergent so there were 
only a few examples of empathy. 
 
Sporadic, emergent 
 
 
 
